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Abstract
Objectives The aim was to outline the challenges of implementing outcomes-based contracts (OBCs) in Europe.
Methods A scoping review was conducted, building on the searches of a previous systematic review and updating them for 
December 2017 until May 2021. The combined results were screened, based on inclusion and exclusion criteria. All identified 
studies published in the English language that described specific OBC schemes for medicines in European countries were 
included. Insights into the challenges of OBCs were extracted and analysed to develop a conceptual framework.
Results Ten articles from the previous systematic review matched our inclusion criteria, along with 14 articles from elec-
tronic searches. Analysis of these 24 articles and classification of the challenges revealed that there are multiple barriers 
that must be overcome if OBCs that benefit all stakeholders are going to be adopted widely across Europe. These challenges 
were grouped according to five key themes: negotiation framework; outcomes; data; administration and implementation; 
and laws and regulation.
Conclusions If the promise of OBCs is to be fully realised in Europe, there remain major challenges that need to be over-
come by all stakeholders working in partnership. The overlapping and interconnected nature of these challenges highlights 
the complexity of OBC arrangements.
Key Points for Decision Makers 
An analysis of the literature and classification of the 
challenges concludes there are multiple barriers that 
must be addressed if outcomes-based contracts (OBCs) 
that benefit all stakeholders are going to be adopted 
widely across Europe. These challenges can be grouped 
according to five key themes: negotiation framework; 
outcomes; data; administration and implementation; and 
laws and regulation.
The overlapping and interconnected nature of these 
challenges highlights the complexity of OBC arrange-
ments. Acknowledging this complexity is the first step to 
moving forward; parties need to develop a fundamentally 
different approach to problem solving to progress from 
there.
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1 Introduction
The development of personalised therapies for increas-
ingly smaller subsets of patients and potentially curative 
interventions for genetic diseases has provided a challenge 
to healthcare systems and the pharmaceutical industry. 
Smaller populations can result in insufficient evidence for 
formal reimbursement decisions as well as challenging 
threshold limitations, with tension in achieving access to 
innovative therapies that is both sustainable and incentiv-
ises innovation. In Europe, this tension is being consid-
ered through different mechanisms, including new licens-
ing and access pathways. There is concern that this may 
introduce methodological complexity into health technol-
ogy assessments (HTAs) [1]. This has renewed the focus 
on how best to pursue a value-based healthcare approach, 
with the aim of providing the best possible outcomes that 
matter to patients at the same or reduced cost.
As part of this approach, the pharmaceutical indus-
try and payers have considered contracting agreements 
designed to achieve value for patients by linking reim-
bursement to outcomes achieved (including clinical out-
comes and/or patient-reported outcomes [PROs]). Out-
comes-based contracts (OBCs) have the potential to offer 
an opportunity to pursue a more effective allocation of 
resources, maximise patient health outcomes, promote the 
use of medicines best fit for patients, and incentivise the 
generation of additional evidence [2, 3]. However, uptake 
across Europe has been mixed, with higher uptake in Italy 
and Spain [4, 5], but a trend to simple discounting in the 
UK and elsewhere [6]. This may provide short-term relief 
to resource-constrained systems, but does not lead to a 
sustainable innovative ecosystem.
This review was performed to assess the challenges of 
developing OBCs in Europe with a view to understanding 
their complexity and barriers to implementation. This is the 
first review specifically focused on the challenges associated 
with implementing OBCs across European health systems, 
therapeutic areas and stakeholders, and addresses the ques-
tion, ‘What are the common challenges in implementing 
OBCs experienced by European health stakeholders?’
2  Methods
A scoping review based on Arksey and O’Malley’s (2005) 
framework [7] was used to address the research question. 
This approach gives an overview of an area of research that 
is heterogeneous and rapidly evolving. It involves identify-
ing the research question, identifying and selecting studies, 
then extracting and analysing the data, and reporting results.
Relevant studies were identified through a literature 
search. The search terms were based on a research paper 
by Cole et al. [8], which was produced in partnership with 
leading European health institutions and includes interviews, 
patient surveys and case studies, as well as multiple sys-
tematic literature reviews (SLRs). It included a systematic 
search of studies that reference specific OBC examples, 
but it did not fully consider challenges in implementation, 
looked at a broader scope of countries, and has not been 
updated since 2018. As this review aimed to appraise OBC 
implementation challenges, which are highly contextual, the 
narrower scope of European countries was used. The origi-
nal search by Cole et al. ran between January 2007 and Janu-
ary 2018 (the search terms are presented in the electronic 
supplementary material). The search was updated for the 
current paper to May 2021. The updated searches were run 
in PubMed, Cumulative Index of Nursing and Allied Health 
Literature (CINAHL), Web of Science and EconLit, as was 
the case in Cole et al. [8]. The reference lists of SLRs eligi-
ble for inclusion were checked, and the search was extended 
by discussion with co-authors to identify any publications 
not published in peer-reviewed scientific papers. It became 
clear that saturation had been reached as no new subthemes 
were identified. After screening of titles and abstracts, full 
texts were reviewed independently according to the inclu-
sion and exclusion criteria by two experienced reviewers. 
Data were extracted by independent reviewers using Micro-
soft Word and analysed using thematic analysis. Following 
familiarisation with the literature, passages of text describ-
ing specific challenges were extracted from included articles. 
These were coded in Microsoft Word, so that conceptual pat-
terns could be identified. These were discussed and iterated 
by the reviewers to form higher order themes and subthemes, 
based on weight from the literature and consensus by the 
reviewers. This resulted in an inductively developed concep-
tual framework with a two-level hierarchy of broad themes 
and detailed subthemes. Following review of the included 
papers, the co-authors assessed the conceptual framework 
for clarity, comprehensiveness and credibility based on their 
experience. The framework was refined by integrating the 
interpretations of all authors until it was concluded that the 
data were fully contextualised.
3  Results
Database searches identified 390 records. Of those, 24 were 
shortlisted for full-text assessment, of which 12 met the 
inclusion criteria. From Cole et al. [8], ten studies met the 
inclusion criteria, and two additional studies were identi-
fied from the SLRs eligible for inclusion (Fig. 1). The main 
reason for exclusion was being a theoretical record, without 
reference to European OBCs (N = 11).
Outcomes-Based Contract Challenges in Europe
The final sample included 24 studies (Table 1). Some 
studies were evaluations of a specific OBC case study, whilst 
others included a broader approach, with multiple OBC 
examples analysed in the same paper.
The key themes that were identified when analysing the 
24 records were as follows: negotiation framework; out-
comes; data; administration and implementation; and laws 
and regulation. Each of these themes was further detailed 
into sub-themes (Table 2). Sample quotes are provided that 
incapsulate the essence of each subtheme and illustrate the 
way in which passages of text were used to identify the 
theme.
Example OBCs are referenced in the following sections 
and summarised in Table 3.
3.1  Negotiation Framework
3.1.1  Terminology
There is variation in the terminology and taxonomy used for 
OBCs. They may also be called outcomes-based agreements, 
pay-for-performance agreements, risk-sharing agreements, 
cost-sharing agreements, coverage with evidence develop-
ment (CED), access with evidence development, patient 
access schemes, conditional licensing, managed entry 
schemes, performance-based risk-sharing agreements and 
payment-by-result arrangements [2, 4, 5, 9–13]. Effective 
communication is the foundation of effective negotiation, 
and thus differences in terminology may be a barrier to a 
positive outcome.
3.1.2  Trust
An underlying lack of trust can undermine the establish-
ment and implementation of OBCs [14, 15]. Whilst there 
are examples of collaborations and partnerships working 
between industry and payers with respect to OBCs [11], 
for instance, the programme for bortezomib in multiple 
myeloma established between Johnson & Johnson and the 
National Health Service (NHS) (UK), these are not the 
norm. Payers often suspect these schemes are extensions 
of marketing activities [16]. Payers also have concerns the 
Marketing Authorisation Holders (MAH) will overprice 
medicines with limited data at market entry, anticipating 
reduced revenues as the evidence base grows [10]. Like-
wise, payers expressed concerns that temporary coverages 
can become permanent [11], as reversing coverage decisions 
is a complex process [17].
OBCs require payers to trust that any refunds will be 
received. This process can be administratively complex 
and relies on the participation of stakeholders who are not 
incentivised to correctly implement the process [10, 18]. 
An alternative refund model proposed in the literature is 
the use of bonus payments for the MAH, also known as 
success fee, when outcomes are achieved [18]. The main 
feature of this model is that payment is provided to the MAH 
after efficacy has been evaluated, which precludes costs for 
non-responders.
Loss aversion amongst patients complicates negotiations. 
Patients can be resistant to losing access to medicines, even 
if new evidence emerges that they are not cost-effective. 
Some OBCs are structured such that a medicine is reim-
bursed temporarily, whilst additional real-world evidence is 
collected [19]. For these agreements to be effective, payers 
need to be confident that they can withdraw a medicine when 
it is not found to be cost-effective, without mass resistance 
from patients [11]. If this is not the case, a payer may prefer 
to delay market access, until further evidence is gathered 
upfront [19].
Fig. 1  Inclusion and exclusion 
criteria for the literature search. 
OBCs outcomes-based contracts
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria
• Specific OBC schemes for medicines, if 
they include: 
o Information on outcomes used in 
the scheme
o Information on how these 
outcomes are measured 
• Papers in English
• Systematic reviews/Rapid Evidence 
Assessments as well as original research 
• Timeframe:
o Papers published between 
January 2007 and January 2018 
(Cole 2019)
o Papers published between 
December 2017 and May 2021
(update)
• Specific OBC schemes with no 
information on outcome used
• Purely theoretical papers, only discussing 
the methodology of OBC schemes
• OBC schemes for health care services, 
systems, diagnostics, etc. (i.e. those that 
are not specific to medicines)
• Commentaries, editorials and features
• Papers published before January 2007
• Papers that only include examples of 
OBC schemes outside of European 
countries (additional requirement).
Abbreviations: OBC: Outcomes-based contracts
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3.1.3  Alignment
A range of stakeholders will be involved in developing 
OBCs, and their assessment of value, attitude to risk, and 
objectives for the negotiation will vary [15]. The OBC 
objectives will also differ by country and healthcare system.
Establishing a shared purpose in a multi-stakeholder 
negotiation requires building trust, respect and an under-
standing of the different motivations, expectations and time 
frames of each party. The literature includes descriptions of 
a successful OBC implementation because of the ‘alignment 
of payer and manufacturer incentives to support better out-
comes’ [11]. Techniques like horizon scanning can also be 
used to inform the contract and its conditions [14]. However, 
early and explicit objective setting is not standard practice 
in OBC negotiations [10], and this lack of a clear guidance 
framework may be a drawback to implementing them [20].
3.1.4  Desirability
When faced with considerable uncertainty about whether a 
product or service is cost-effective, payers have four options: 
adopt or partially adopt with the option to revisit the deci-
sion if more information becomes available; refuse to adopt 
until better information is supplied; demand or mandate a 
lower price; or enter into an OBC [10].
Whether an OBC represents the best reimbursement 
option is a significant decision for all stakeholders. It 
requires detailed exchange of information and data, as well 
as challenging questions regarding data collection, data pri-
vacy and scheme structure to be addressed upfront. Short-
term static benefits such as whether the new intervention is 
prescribed to the appropriate population are easier to meas-
ure than long-term, dynamic efficiency benefits that result 
from aligning incentives in a way that promotes high-quality 
research and evidence generation [7]. Typically only the for-
mer are considered explicitly, yet the latter are fundamental 
to evaluating the benefit of an OBC [10].
Assessing the desirability of different OBCs is made more 
challenging due to the limited evaluation of existing schemes 
in the public domain [21]. Key information such as the 
health outcomes measures used and the analyses performed 
are seldom publicly available [12], and economic modelling 
is uncommon [3]. Furthermore, learning from other country 
examples is often prevented because information about the 
effectiveness of the current schemes is rarely available [5].
3.1.5  Risk
The anatomy of an agreement comprises three basic compo-
nents: the expected return; upside potential; and downside 
risk. The objective of all parties in an OBC is to have a 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Outcomes-Based Contract Challenges in Europe
The risk for each party associated with an OBC will vary 
for different products and populations [16]. One of the key 
challenges for the negotiation is balancing risk and reward 
for each party, taking account of their overall attitude to risk.
OBCs provide a mechanism to share the burden of uncer-
tainty regarding the affordability, real-world efficacy and 
cost-effectiveness of innovative medicines between payers 
and the MAH [18]. However, in many cases, OBCs have 
been used to transfer risk from payers to the MAH, particu-
larly in cases where the agreement on reimbursement has not 
been reached using the normal decision-making framework. 
Neumann et al. [11] raises the further question as to whether 
the MAH can obtain additional gains if medicines offer 
unexpected benefits. Conversely, for schemes like CED, it 
may happen that while evidence is being developed, payers 
still pay full price for the technology, with no possibility of 
recuperating those expenses if the evidence does not support 
the agreed upon price [17].
Agreeing which party bears the burden of proof is chal-
lenging and doing so can be complex and costly. In prac-
tice, the burden of proof sits with the beneficiary of the 
adjustment, which will depend on whether this is a bonus or 
a discount. The way in which the responsibility for establish-
ing burden of proof is defined within an OBC has significant 
implications for the level of risk borne by each party.
3.1.6  Governance
It is good practice to establish clear governance structures 
for OBCs. Such structures should contemplate how data 
are collected, including who owns the data and how it will 
be audited; when payments are initiated; how funding is 
activated; and when appeals can be launched in the case of 
outcomes not being achieved [14]. Such schemes should be 
open to all eligible organisations, irrespective of size, geo-
graphical location, or product portfolio. This builds on the 
established procurement processes and could be in the form 
of ‘requests for OBC’ schemes amongst competing MAH in 
given disease areas or patient populations [16].
The cost of outcome data collection can be substantial, 
and ensuring the integrity and validity of the process is cru-
cial [11, 16]. From a legal and ethical perspective, patients 
Table 3  Examples of OBCs referenced in main body text
NHS National Health Service, OBAs outcome-based agreements
Programme Partners Year Example of which challenge References
Risedronate for osteoporosis Warner Chilcott/Health Alli-
ance (USA)
2008 Data infrastructure Neumann et al., 2011 [11]
Certolizumab pegol for rheu-
matoid arthritis
UCB Pharma (Catalonia, 
Spain)
2017 Complexity García-Collado et al., 2021 
[21]
Oxaliplatin for treatment of 
stage III colon cancer
The Netherlands (Not reported) Patient outcomes
Data infrastructure
Bouvy et al., 2018 [15]




(Not reported) Patient outcomes Kim et al., 2020 [40]
Tisagenlecleucel for B-cell 
acute lymphoblastic leukae-
mia and Diffuse large B-cell 
lymphoma
Haute Autorité de Sante 
(France)
(Not reported) Human resources
Administration and data col-
lections costs
Ronco et al., 2021 [43]
Acetylcholinesterase inhibitor 
for Alzheimer’s disease
Italian NHS (Italy) (Not reported) Treatment efficacy Adamski et al., 2010 [16]
Zampirolli Dias et al., 2020 [2]
Beta-interferon for multiple 
sclerosis
NHS (UK) 2003 Overly long time horizons, 
unpredictable time horizons
Adamski et al., 2010 [16] 
Neumann et al., 2011 [11]
Garrison et al., 2013 [10]
Continuous intraduodenal 
infusion of levodopa/car-
bidopa for the treatment 
of advanced Parkinson’s 
disease
Neopharma (Sweden) 2005 Time consuming process 
for gathering evidence and 
negotiating reimbursement
Willis et al., 2010 [19]
Sitagliptin/sitagliptin
with metformin for diabetes
Merck/Cigna (USA) 2009 Effective incentive alignment Neumann et al., 2011 [11]
Ranibizumab for macular 
degeneration
Novartis/ NHS (UK) 2008 Administrative burden and 
compliance
Neumann et al., 2011 [11]
Nilotinib or dasatinib for 
chronic myeloid leukaemia
(Not reported) (Not reported) Overly short time horizons Garattini and Casadei, 2011 [5]
Bortezomib in multiple 
myeloma
Johnson & Johnson/NHS 
(UK)
2006 Administrative burden of 
tracking patient outcomes
Neumann et al., 2011 [11]
 N. Bohm et al.
who are having information about their health collected 
should be informed as to whether the payer or MAH is pro-
viding funding [16].
For an OBC to function effectively, there needs to be a 
clear and pre-agreed process for revising the price or the 
eligible patient population. Garrison et al. [10] makes a 
distinction between schemes that specify the way in which 
additional evidence will affect pricing and those with a pre-
specified review date at which a new price will be negotiated. 
If this process and the associated timelines are not clearly 
defined, there is a risk that access and price remain constant 
due to inertia, even if new evidence becomes available [11]. 
Neumann et al. [11] cites the example of beta-interferons in 
the UK which were not found to be cost-effective at the 2009 
review date, yet prices had not been adjusted 2 years later.
The risk that new therapies may not be cost-effective 
for an individual patient or group of patients is inherent to 
OBCs. Prior to commencement, there needs to be an agree-
ment in place for withdrawing the medicine, and—where 
applicable—transferring patients to an alternative [22]. 
Adamski et al. [16] concluded that clear ‘exit strategies’ 
need to be planned in advance, to respond to situations in 
which treatments do not achieve the specified outcomes. 
For patients who are benefiting, appropriate ‘grandfather-
ing’ mechanisms may need to be in place. Willis et al. [19] 
described the situation in which the intestinal gel levodopa/
carbidopa was found not to be cost-effective, yet discontinu-
ation would require burdensome surgery, making delisting 
impractical.
3.1.7  Complexity
OBCs are inherently more complex than standard discounts 
both to evaluate and to implement. This is perhaps the most 
commonly cited deterrent for healthcare payers [13, 15, 17, 
20].
Complexity can result from variation of established 
standard of care between healthcare providers, making selec-
tion of a baseline or comparator more difficult. Agreeing the 
comparator and ensuring it has widespread use is required 
ahead of any OBC commencing.
An additional source of complexity is that the patients 
initially prescribed the medicine will not always be those 
most likely to benefit [16]. The clinical trial cohort of 
patients may not always reflect the external validity of a 
more heterogeneous real-world patient population. This 
uncertainty has significant implications for the cost-effec-
tiveness of the medicine, and consequently the reimburse-
ment that is linked to patient outcomes. There are some 
ways to mitigate this risk. Navarria et al. [18] points to 
the Italian example of Italian Medicines Agency (Agen-
zia Italiana del Farmaco) ‘AIFA Notes’, which limit the 
reimbursement of the medicine to the agreed population 
subgroups.
3.2  Outcomes
3.2.1  Treatment Efficacy and Safety
OBCs require stakeholders to have explicit conversations 
about when a therapy ‘works’ [11]. A major challenge lies 
in the specification and determination of treatment effects 
in non-randomised settings, where only certain types of 
outcome may prove suitable [11, 23]. Changes in clinical 
practice over time also constrain the reliable measurement 
of a treatment’s effectiveness [13].
Ideally, outcomes should be objective, clearly defined, 
reproducible and difficult to manipulate [11]. Successful 
OBCs have had clearly defined clinical events such as osteo-
porosis fractures confirmed with x-ray or well-established 
biomarkers such as reduction in serum M protein in multiple 
myeloma [11].
OBCs take place in non-randomised settings and can 
be affected by factors beyond the control of stakeholders. 
Health systems, clinical pathways, treatment adherence, 
socioeconomic status and behavioural factors can all influ-
ence outcome collection and may not be considered during 
negotiations [11].
3.2.2  Patient Outcomes
The outcomes that matter most to patients were not explored 
comprehensively in the literature. Proven validated surrogate 
outcomes may not exist for all therapeutic areas [14]. These 
domains may be explored through patient-reported outcome 
measures (PROMs) that capture health-related quality of 
life, symptom burden, and/or function, and can be paired 
with clinical outcomes to better understand the patient expe-
rience of treatment [24]. Though Neumann et al. [11] made 
mention of the risk of failing to measure outcomes that mat-
ter most to patients, such as fatigue in multiple sclerosis, 
they cited a New York Times article that stated ‘measuring 
improvements in the quality of life is an imprecise science at 
best’ [25]. Both articles demonstrate a gap in understanding 
of the rigorous science behind patient outcomes research.
3.2.3  Time Horizon
The selection of treatments suitable for an OBC must con-
sider the outcome timescale for the condition. Timeframes 
must be long enough to allow for a reliable clinical assess-
ment and adequate data collection but not so long that 
they become difficult to enforce or execute [5, 14, 23]. For 
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example, only a small proportion of chronic myeloid leu-
kaemia patients resistant to nilotinib or dasatinib can be 
detected within 4 weeks [5]. Therefore, assessing haema-
tological and cytogenic tests over a longer period—such as 
3–6 months—might be a more sensible ‘threshold’ to dis-
tinguish non-responders from patients who are more likely 
to benefit from this treatment [5].
On the other hand, long timelines have other risks [17, 
23]. Technological advancements can result in changed 
clinical practice that make the OBC obsolete. Difficulties 
in timelines can arise due to slow patient recruitment [5] or 
challenges capturing and accessing data [9].
3.3  Data
3.3.1  Data Infrastructure and Integrity
Decentralised healthcare systems often have their own data 
infrastructure, making it technically challenging to share 
patient information between systems [5, 9, 20]. Even in the 
UK’s ‘national’ health system, the data infrastructure is frac-
tured, and linkage is difficult.
One of the challenges of ensuring the reliability and 
validity of OBC data is that it is managed on a per patient 
basis, where response is based on individual trajectory and 
is not aggregated to inform evidence-based reimbursement 
decisions [12, 16, 22]. It is also challenging to guard against 
bias in the selection of patients. In a review of 19 OBCs, 
Jarosławski and Toumi [22] did not identify any process to 
ensure an unbiased selection of patients in Italy.
Ethical considerations are important when stakeholders 
are considering OBCs [16]. A lack of transparent or estab-
lished procurement and monitoring processes could lead to 
preferential treatment, bias or gaming [16]. These concerns 
could be addressed through the utilisation of a trusted third 
party to undertake data collection or analysis within com-
mon data formats [14, 15].
The evaluation of proposed arrangements must also 
adhere to high ethical standards, including the declaration 
of any contacts and conflicts of interest between experts and 
MAH that could potentially influence evaluations [16].
3.3.2  Data Privacy
Legal and clinical governance considerations must be fully 
addressed when proposing and developing future OBCs 
[2, 16]. This includes data ownership, intellectual property 
rights and opportunities for appeal [16]. Ensuring privacy 
and security of data is paramount to gain support from 
patients and other data owners. In Europe, MAH are bound 
by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and 
Code of Conduct on Data [26], and collection of personal 
data requires compliance with that regulation [14]. However, 
complying with data privacy regulations can add further bur-
den to the analyses [2].
Furthermore, participation in an OBC should be clearly 
explained to patients and consideration should be given as 
to how this may complicate the principle of informed con-
sent. These regulatory issues, and the expertise required to 
meet them, received limited discussion within the academic 
literature [12]. This may in part be due to the pace at which 
this area is evolving.
3.4  Administration and Implementation
3.4.1  Human Resources
For many payers, OBCs are a new paradigm, different to the 
tools and techniques used in previous assessment of treat-
ments. Designing and implementing OBCs is complex, time 
consuming and requires strong leadership. Clopes et al. iden-
tified leadership as the most important organisational aspect 
of implementation of OBCs [9].
There also need to be appropriately trained professionals 
in place to evaluate the proposed schemes, from the pre-
liminary stages of negotiation to the pharmacy and clini-
cal contexts [3]. These include healthcare professionals, 
pharmacology, IT and economic experts [16]. Michelsen 
et al. [14] highlighted how low compliance with data input 
from healthcare professionals resulted in low-quality and 
insufficient data, during the implementation of CED in the 
Netherlands and outcome-based agreements (OBAs) in Italy. 
The burden of data collection for healthcare and other pro-
fessionals involved, as well as patients, should be anticipated 
[2, 3, 13].
To meet the expanded responsibilities of OBC negotia-
tion, implementation and management, the mandates and 
processes of regulatory, HTA and funding organisations may 
need to be revised.
3.4.2  Administration and Data Collection Costs
OBCs generate additional costs and require additional 
resources, responsibility for which remains unclear. These 
include developing data collection protocols, negotiat-
ing arrangements, assessing product performance, polic-
ing contractual arrangements and designing procedures to 
adjudicate disputes. For instance, one OBC for a multiple 
sclerosis medicine in the UK required 120 additional nurses 
in 70 centres to implement the agreement [11]. Long-term 
funding is required alongside the technical infrastructure 
to capture and analyse the data. The complexity of imple-
menting a risk-sharing agreement for enzyme replacement 
therapy in lysosomal storage diseases at a national level led 
the Spanish authorities to instead establish regional or even 
hospital-level agreements [27]. For certain technologies, the 
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administrative burden of these schemes may offset the ben-
efits [2, 3, 13, 14].
Variation between the administrative requirements of 
different schemes adds further complexity. For example, 
ranibizumab involved clear criteria—a dose cap at 14 injec-
tions—which resulted in a relatively low administrative bur-
den. In contrast, the multiple sclerosis arrangement involved 
a longer timeframe, difficult to gauge outcomes and higher 
administrative costs [11].
3.4.3  Claims Management
Response-based schemes pose challenges for tracking 
patients and ensuring that refunds are claimed [3], creat-
ing an additional administrative burden [20]. A survey 
of oncology pharmacists in 31 UK NHS hospitals found 
that between 2007 and 2009, 47% of eligible manufacturer 
paybacks from OBCs were not recovered by Primary Care 
Trusts [22]. Experience is similar in Italy, where Navarria 
et al. [18] suggest there is no incentive for healthcare profes-
sionals to update the registries, close the patients’ files and 
submit a refund claim on a regular basis, possibly because 
the money to be refunded does not go to the prescribing 
cost centre, rather to the hospital general budget. Therefore, 
an ‘incentivisation gap’ exists between the stakeholder who 
receives the funding and the individual in charge of the reim-
bursement procedures [3, 18].
3.5  Laws and Regulation
3.5.1  Variation in Legal Context
A solid legal framework is essential to every OBC, [9] yet 
this can be complex to establish [11]. The laws and regu-
lations that govern OBCs in each country and region are 
highly variable [12, 13]. For instance, in France and the UK, 
price negotiations occur at a national level [10], whereas 
in Spain they occur at a regional level [9]. Garrison et al. 
[10] note that France were considering a law that would fine 
MAH who did not provide evidence in a timely manner to 
disincentivise them from holding back unfavourable results.
Navigating the diverse and evolving legal landscape is a 
challenge to manufacturers pursuing OBCs in multiple coun-
tries. Michelsen et al. [14] suggested how scientific advice 
should be sought from the European Medicines Agency 
(EMA) and the different HTA bodies on how to enable col-
laborations between the regulatory agency and multiple 
national payers.
3.5.2  Fiscal
As discussed earlier, some OBCs have long timelines, and 
this results in a delay in determining whether the agreed 
patient outcomes have been achieved. Thus, the MAH may 
receive payment—or payers rebates—long after the medi-
cine is dispensed. Reimbursement may occur in a different 
tax year, creating fiscal and accrual challenges for all stake-
holders [14], including government treasury departments 
[18].
4  Discussion
This scoping review is the first to examine the challenges of 
implementing OBCs across European healthcare systems, 
and to develop a comprehensive framework. Some of the 
challenges that have been highlighted are familiar; concerns 
around the complexity and cost of implementation, particu-
larly in relation to data infrastructure for recording patient 
outcomes, have been discussed elsewhere [3, 12, 15]. This 
analysis of the published literature identified several less-
recognised areas for further research on challenges associ-
ated with OBCs, which are discussed below.
This review did not assess the impact of specific OBC 
schemes because, as has been discussed, the necessary infor-
mation is generally not made available publicly. Further, the 
review stops short of making detailed recommendations for 
how to overcome the challenges discussed. As the review is 
limited to considering challenges within Europe, it does not 
include those relating to OBC examples in other healthcare 
systems, such as the United States (US).
There was little discussion in the literature of the role that 
patients and healthcare providers play in OBC measurement 
frameworks, negotiation and implementation, despite cover-
age of multiple issues relevant to them. Examples include 
incentives to participate in outcomes data collection and 
monitoring; the prioritisation and relevance of selected 
outcomes; privacy concerns surrounding data ownership, 
security and sharing; uncertainty around treatments being 
de-listed as the result of ex-post review; and the existence 
of subsequent treatment plans or changing treatment path-
ways. In our view, a critical examination of the implication 
of OBCs for patients and healthcare providers is vital to 
ensure better outcomes for all parties.
Relatedly, there is minimal discussion of outcomes 
that matter most to patients and how this is integral to 
understanding the value of a treatment [21]. The literature 
focuses on clinical outcomes with the apparent percep-
tion they are more objective, unbiased and quantifiable. 
However, quantifying the patient experience with robust 
methodology and analysis includes direct patient insights, 
disease-specific conceptual frameworks and measure-
ment with valid, reliable and sensitive instruments used 
in an appropriate context [28, 29]. Evaluating these com-
plex, and at times interdependent, variables impacting 
treatment outcomes creates an opportunity to enhance 
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shared patient–clinician decision making [30] and system 
resource allocation, [31, 32] and may guide development 
of outcome measurement frameworks informing OBCs in 
the future. This has particular potential in the UK, where 
there is a history of using PROMs for comparisons of pro-
viders’ performance [33]. Further research is critical to 
establish patient outcomes research methodology as a tool 
to transform value and access conversations.
Challenges of OBCs in the US have received coverage 
elsewhere, and the context for implementing OBCs differs 
[34–36]. This paper examines patterns in the challenges dis-
cussed in the European literature. Some of the challenges 
included in this study are specific to the EU, or to particular 
countries within the EU; others are more general. Regulatory 
compliance is highly contextual, with different considera-
tions at the regional, national and international level. Clopes 
et al. [9] highlight the importance of Catalonian oncology 
policy for OBCs in that region. Complying with the GDPR 
and ensuring data security whilst harnessing the increas-
ing capability to capture and analyse real-time data is a key 
consideration across EU health systems [26]. Research in 
the US context focuses less on data governance and more 
on other areas of legislation, such as the Medicaid Drug 
Rebate Program’s (MDRP’s) ‘best price requirement’ [36]. 
Co-ordinated pursuit of value for money via HTA is less of a 
dominant paradigm within the US system [37]. Although the 
UK has left the EU, much of the shared regulatory frame-
work remains in place, and there is substantial commonality 
between health systems.
Distrust between payers and the pharmaceutical indus-
try is a recurring theme and a characterisation of zero-sum 
price focused negotiations. This is one area in which the 
authors believe that there has been progress towards a more 
collaborative relationship that recognises the shared desire 
to achieve improved outcomes that matter most to patients. 
That process is based on a rigorous assessment of value 
throughout the whole care pathway and not simply through 
good negotiation skills. There is an appetite on all sides 
to explore greater use of OBCs, but there does need to be 
greater shared understanding of the challenges faced by both 
industry and payers in implementing them. Trust is easily 
lost; without sensitivity as to where OBCs can put greater 
pressure on healthcare systems, it is easy to assume that the 
reluctance to implement them is due to other motives. This 
review is instrumental in highlighting the areas of poten-
tial misunderstanding so that they can be considered and 
addressed in advance of OBC design.
Progress has also been made towards technical OBC 
solutions, such as third-party platforms for facilitating 
data collection, analysis and payments [38]. This has the 
potential to build the trust needed for OBCs to function 
effectively and must include transparent protocols to meet 
data governance regulation.
There are two factors that drive the gaps that have been 
identified in the literature: limited transparent evalua-
tion of existing schemes and a lag between developments 
within a rapidly evolving policy area and the academic 
literature. Future research may attempt to address these 
gaps by drawing on alternative sources, such as interviews, 
in addition to the published literature. A European register 
of existing schemes, with sensitive financial information 
removed, would enhance collective understanding.
Historically, OBCs were used as a vehicle of risk shar-
ing, facilitating reimbursement of the MAH and reducing 
the risk faced by the payers. OBCs have also been used as 
a ‘last-resort’ when traditional reimbursement structures 
were ineffective at achieving agreement, but this is chang-
ing. For example, new medicines, including curative thera-
pies and advanced therapy medicinal products (ATMPs) 
present a significant value potential, but also a cost con-
tainment challenge [39]. OBCs present a mechanism for 
providing reimbursement at a level proportional to the 
value they create, by linking the level of reimbursement, 
and the timing, to the outcomes achieved for patients, 
thus, achieving a mutually beneficial arrangement across 
all stakeholders. These opportunities mean they are likely 
to have a significant role in how the life sciences industry 
is reimbursed in the future.
5  Conclusion
Although shared information, knowledge and technical 
understanding are important for OBC implementation, they 
are not enough. These agreements are complex structures, 
which require partnership, collaboration and learning by a 
range of stakeholders with complementary expertise.
An OBC that worked in one place at one time will not 
necessarily work somewhere else or even in the same place 
at another time, even with the challenge appearing super-
ficially to be the same. Acknowledging this complexity 
through dialogue is the first step to moving forward; par-
ties may need to develop a fundamentally different approach 
to problem solving to progress from there. As European 
healthcare systems evolve their regulatory and reimburse-
ment landscape, and adopt ways of contracting for innova-
tive therapeutics that balance sustainability and innovation, 
appreciating the challenges highlighted by this review will 
be key to constructive dialogue.
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